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Foreword: What We Talk About When We Talk
About Workplace Privacy
Anita Bernstein *
When seven academic experts gathered in Baton Rouge to
expound on the elusive concept of workplace privacy, they kindly
kept a place for me at their table to attempt a summary of their
insights. Consistent with the soupqon of technophobia that flavors
most contemporary gatherings on the law of workplace privacy in
the United States,' I start by encouraging readers to fight the
tendency of electronic media to cut law review commentary into
small pieces2 and read, if they can, the entire collection of seven
papers published in this issue of the Louisiana Law Review. With
utter confidence I say that no matter how deep or shallow your
knowledge of this field may be, you will find material for
reflection here, both in the individual papers and the book that they
combine to form.
Many possible divergent approaches in a Foreword could try to
unite this bounteous collection. My own overview begins with its
disarray: How can one speak of workplace privacy, given that this
field has (at least so far) refused to settle on a definition of this
term? 3  During our weekend at the LSU campus, speakers
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* Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University, and Wallace Stevens
Professor of Law, New York Law School. My thanks to the editors of the
Louisiana Law Review and Professor William Corbett for the exquisite
hospitality-and careful logistics-that they brought to this Symposium, and to
Michael Ausubel for skilled research assistance.
1. For example, one online fact sheet on workplace privacy published for
public reference begins with an overview of monitoring technology. Workplace
Privacy and Employee Monitoring, Fact Sheet No. 7: Workplace Privacy,
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs7-work.htm.
See also Frederick S. Lane III, The Naked Employee: How Technology is
Compromising Workplace Privacy 4 (2003) (noting that "the trends that drive
technology-faster, smaller, cheaper-make it possible for larger and larger
numbers of employers to gather ever-greater amounts of personal data"). Our
conference impresario, Bill Corbett, has written insightfully about electronic
monitoring technologies at work. William R. Corbett, The Need for a
Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 Brooklyn L. Rev. 91, 102-05
(2003).
2. My more positive take on this phenomenon appears in Anita Bernstein,
Restatement Redux, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1663, 1670 (1995).
3. So, for instance, contributor Finkin begins his treatise on workplace
privacy by describing privacy in general. Matthew W. Finkin, Privacy in
Employment Law xxiii (2d ed 2003) [hereinafter Finkin, Privacy]. Only later in
the introduction does Finkin move to the workplace. Id. at xxix. Another
contributor has come closer to writing a definition of this term. Pauline T. Kim,
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occasionally lamented the lack of cohesion or unity in our subject
matter. They had standing to express regret: they live in the field.
For me as outsider-observer, the lack of an agreed-on definition of
workplace privacy seemed of interest---revealing and
informative-rather than problematic. So I sat at the table and
wrote down what I heard speakers offer as partial aspects of the
concept.4 Let me next share some of what the Symposium
contributions say here, and then investigate how, perhaps, the dots
connect.
I. ASPECTS OF WORKPLACE PRIVACY
In lieu of a definition, our Symposium contributors relate
workplace privacy to a range of complementary concepts.
A. The Human Aversion to Surveillance
Participants invoke workplace privacy with reference to what
employers invade or trammel on the job. Observed urination, for
example, strikes two participants, Dean Steven Willborn and
Professor Pauline Kim, as an invasion. 5 Professor Michael Selmi
remarks that global positioning devices used to monitor employee
whereabouts "may seem intrusive," although Selmi goes on to
conclude that "functionally they are little more than a substitute for
Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 Ohio State
L.J. 671, 700-01 (1996) (naming access to a person's body and bodily functions,
information about a person's health and sexuality, a person's home, and the
communications that a person makes by telephone and the mails as areas that
have "frequently been recognized as private").
4. A cautionary word about American parochialism: Other national legal
systems have come closer to expressing a sense of the concept. The
comparative scholarship of Symposium contributor Finkin has been prominent
in contrasting American treatments of workplace privacy with those of other
nations. See infra Part I.E. In this Foreword, I focus on the American context
that occupied our Symposium.
5. Steven L. Willborn, Consenting Employees: Workplace Privacy and the
Role of Consent, 66 La. L. Rev. 975, 1003 n.105 (2006) ("With direct
observation of urination, one might assert that should be a problem even if the
employee consents."). Kim described a case where a manager at the St. Louis
supermarket chain Schnuck's appeared to overreact to an incident where a
worker cut himself on a slicing machine; citing a "policy" of after-accident
protocols, this manager ordered the worker to strip naked and urinate for a drug
test while being observed. Pauline Kim, Professor of Law, Washington
University in St. Louis, Comparing Collective and Individual Approaches to
Protecting Employee Privacy, Address at the Louisiana Law Review
Symposium: Privacy in the Workplace (Feb. 9, 2006).
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visual monitoring."6 Professor Charles Craver refers to "cameras
or microphones" that "spy upon the protected organizational
activities of employees."
7
These references to surveillance rest at the edges of
participants' contributions. No author deems them central to the
material he or she covers. Several of them note the evident
lawfulness of surveillance at work. Putting aside exceptionally
intrusive invasions-such as a surreptitiously mounted one-way
glass looking into toilet stalls-along with intrusions into
concerted activity, our participants agree that employees have no
legally recognized privacy interest in remaining free from
employer snooping. Courts regard the acceptance of employment
as acceptance of the invasions that employers choose to impose.8
Keystrokes at computer terminals may be monitored; GPS tracking
devices can beam to an employer where employees are; workers'
e-mail is not sacred. "To the extent we equate privacy with an
ability, or a desire, to hide things, employers are rightfully
suspicious of broad declarations of privacy rights for their
employees," concludes Selmi.9
(As a spectator at the conference, I would like to have seen a
little more of a fight on surveillance. One might argue, for
instance, that observation via closed-circuit television camera is
worse than the human-on-human snooping to which Selmi
compared it--if only because a video image of a face can be re-
wound and replayed, edited, and enlarged into grotesque nostril-
boring expansion, whereas the human snoop gets nothing to exploit
beyond his glance.' 0 Conference participants did not argue against
6. Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class: Public Work and
Private Lives, 66 La. L. Rev. 1035, 1045 (124) (2006).
7. Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and
Labor Organizations, 66 La. L. Rev. 1057, 1068 (2006).
8. Apparently even deception by the employer does not necessarily defeat
this prerogative. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 2d 97 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (holding that employer did not violate employees' privacy by intercepting
and reading e-mail and then firing an employee for making comments
derogatory of management in this e-mail, even though the employer had
announced that it would not intercept e-mail or use messages against
employees); Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah
App. 1992) (finding no liability for invasion of privacy when an employer
pretended to be a market researcher and entered an employee's home on this
pretext, to investigate a claim of work injury). These cases, along with others,
are cited and discussed in Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United
States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 65, 82-84
(2000).
9. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1043.
10. For this line of thought I am indebted to my colleague Carlin Meyer.
Professor Meyer shared her thoughts on workplace privacy with me in a phone
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the pro-surveillance consensus in American law. And yet most of
them did take a moment to mention the topic. They noted the way
people feel when they are snooped upon, without advocating law-
based relief to ease this discomfort.)
B. Autonomy
References to autonomy arise frequently in this Symposium,
although not every contributor favors this word. At the conference
and in his article, Willborn prefers to speak of "consent." In this
volume he begins with the somber sketch of privacy that Ruth
Gavison pioneered a generation ago." Gavison contrasts "perfect"
privacy with the perfect absence of privacy using three
variables--"secrecy," "anonymity," and "solitude"-that combine
to express a level of accessibility. A person experiences perfect
privacy when nobody has information about her (Gavison's
"secrecy"), "no one pays attention to her (anonymity), and no one
has physical access to her (solitude)." 12 At the other end of the
accessibility continuum, a person experiences "a state of perfect
lack of privacy" when all information about him is known;
everything he does is known and attributed to him by his name;
and he is continuously observed. 13 Neither extreme makes for a
desirable way to live. The concept of consent, Willbom argues,
mediates between the two extremes, or at least it can do so away
from the workplace. Willborn concedes that "consent in
employment settings is difficult and compromised."14 In dealings
with some people, we all want solitude, secrecy, and anonymity; in
dealings with others-our intimates or people who might become
our intimates-such conditions would make us feel bleak and
isolated. Like the anti-surveillance version of privacy just
mentioned above, Willborn's consent-based version of autonomy
works with negative concepts. Privacy in this view is manifest in
its barriers.
Other participants, providing a contrast, invoked autonomy
with reference to overt, or positive, expressions. In the view of
Professors Rafael Gely and Leonard Bierman, employee-created
conversation on February 8, 2006. See also Lane, supra note 1 at 119-23
(discussing prurient and voyeuristic misuses of video footage in the workplace).
11. Willborn, supra note 5, at 977 (citing Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421 (1980)).
12. Id. at 977.
13. Id. at 977.
14. Id. at 1008.
926 [Vol. 66
FOREWORD
blogs fit within the subject matter of this conference, even though
one might think of a blog as the opposite of privacy: Gely and
Bierman note that reading a blog once felt like "reading someone
else's diary over their shoulder."'15 Around the time of the 9/11
terrorist attacks and the beginning of war in Iraq, however, the
blog took on a different identity. Gely and Bierman note the
distinctive features of blogs: a reverse-chronological presentation
of content, the use of links, interactive capacity, and low entry
costs. 16 These characteristics combine to bring the blogger into the
reader's life in a relationship that is much more dynamic and fluid
than the relation between, for example, newspaper editorial writer
and reader. From there, Gely and Bierman suggest, it is a short
step indeed for a blogger to feel she needs this medium: the blog
comes to be integral to who she is and how she communicates with
other people. To shut it down would feel like an amputation.
17
Not surprisingly, as Gely and Bierman show, the expression within
employee blogs has gotten workers in trouble with their
employers,' 8 while employers for their part have adopted the
medium to present themselves in a flattering light:19 the blog as
artifice and P.R. For increasing numbers of employees and
employers, the blog embodies and expresses a version of their
personality that they adopt and reshape in response to feedback
from their readers.
15. Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Workplace Blogs and Workers'
Privacy, 66 La. L. Rev. 1079 (67) (2006) (quoting Andrew Sullivan, A Blogger
Manifesto: Why Online Weblogs Are One Future for Journalism, February 24,
2002, http://www.andrewsullivan.com/mainarticle.php?artnum2002O224).
16. Id. at 1082.
17. Not always: some people start to blog and then quit. At the spoken
version of this Symposium, Gely described himself as "a recovering blogger";
his experiment with the medium ran for about a year before he concluded that it
was "not [his] cup of tea." Rafael Gely, Professor of Law, University of
Cincinnati College of Law, Workplace Blogs and Workers' Privacy, Address at
the Louisiana Law Review Symposium: Privacy in the Workplace (Feb. 9,
2006). At the same event, we participants observed Paul M. Secunda of the
University of Mississippi School of Law brewing quite a cup of tea: using a
laptop and the room's wireless connection, Professor Secunda generated lively
and visually elegant content for his blog, in real time. See
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
18. Gely & Bierman, supra note 15.
19. Id.; see also Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Enlists Bloggers in P.R.
Campaign, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 2006, available at 2006 WNLR 3798247
("Under assault as never before, Wal-Mart is increasingly looking beyond the
mainstream media and working directly with bloggers, feeding them exclusive
nuggets of news, suggesting topics for postings and even inviting them to visit
its corporate headquarters.").
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Professor Catherine Fisk explores another positive variation on
the theme of workplace privacy as autonomy, or what she calls
"autonomy privacy": "Clothes and appearance are constitutive of
how we see and feel about ourselves and how we construct
ourselves for the rest of the world,, 20 she writes. Like a blog,
clothes seem unrelated to privacy as understood in either anti-
surveillance sentiment or the Gavison-Willborn concepts of
secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.21  When privacy emerges as
autonomy, however, it becomes possible to find violations of it in
edicts to change one's display or to stop displaying. Fisk reminds
us that David Stern of the National Basketball Association decreed
"that professional basketball players should dress like businessmen
rather than rappers when they appear in public," while Yankees-
meister George Steinbrenner forced a haircut on star center fielder
Johnny Damon. These employers were "trying to make employees
project an image that the employees [did not] want to project, 22
thereby treading on autonomy. Fisk concludes that privacy theory
should be "available to any employee who can convince a court
that some aspect of a dress code is offensive to their authentic
self.",2
3
C. Menschenbild: Persinlichkeitsrecht
The "autonomy privacy" understanding of workplace privacy,
though broader than the negative understanding that Willbom
expresses, is narrower than a version of workplace privacy found
in some European legal systems. These conceptions go beyond the
episodes of autonomy that Gely, Bierman, and Fisk have
presented-freedom to blog, freedom to groom or not groom
according to a boss's wish-by constructing a legal doctrine of
personhood that recognizes enforceable rights and entitlements. In
his writings on comparative workplace privacy, Professor Matthew
Finkin suggests that English may lack some essential words that
could shed light on this concept.
20. Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-
Examining Appearance Regulations as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 La. L. Rev.
1111, 1111-12 (29-30) (2006).
21. See id.
22. Id. at 1120.
23. Id. at 1138. Willborn, who focuses on the contractual aspects of
workplace privacy, would likely find no violation of privacy in the Steinbrenner
edict. If an employer wants to pay, and an employee receive, millions of dollars
for a deal that includes an employer-mandated hairstyle for the employee, so be
it, I believe Willborn would say.
928 [Vol. 66
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Finkin starts with Menschenbild, literally the German word for
"picture of Man" and figuratively a conception of the human being
from which generalizations can be extracted. For example, "homo
economicus" is the Menschenbild of neoclassical economics, while
communitarianism paints a Menschenbild of "civil responsibility
and social accountability. ' '24 Finkin's review of workplace privacy
law in other countries' perspective identifies a Menschenbild in
Germany that has more commitment to what might inadequately
be called in English "personality. 25  The German
Pers6nlichkeitsrecht, or legal category of oersonhood-personality,
conveys some flavor of this conception. Similarly, the law in
France sees each person as possessing a counterpart to
Persdnlichkeitsrecht that she does not relinquish at the workplace
threshold.27
American law does not overlook or neglect the individual as a
locus of rights and entitlements, but it does tend to juxtapose this
rights-bearer only against the government, and so within American
law the Menschenbild of conflict between private individuals or
entities is expressed in terms of property and contract rather than
personality. Finkin's comparative studies suggest that this
American choice is not inevitable: American law could compel
private actors as well as government entities to honor conceptions
of individuals, including workers, in their ownership of personae.
28
Instead, workplace privacy in the United States is relegated mostly
to the employment contract, and American law concludes that
workers consent to personality-infringing edicts when they accept
their jobs.29
24. Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as
a Person in Western Law, 23 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 577, 579 n. 11 (2002)
(hereinafter Finkin, Menschenbild).
25. Presenting his paper to the audience in Baton Rouge, Finkin remarked
that "personality" is a trivial word in contemporary English: whenever a person
is said to have a nice personality, or no personality, the comment is understood
not to go very deep. Matthew W. Finkin, Albert J. Harno Professor, University
of Illinois College of Law, Life Away From Work, Address at the Louisiana
Law Review Symposium: Privacy in the Workplace (Feb. 9, 2006).
26. A well-known Personlichkeitsrecht-based decision of the European
Court of Human Rights accepted a claim by Caroline of Monaco that her rights
to privacy and personhood were violated by the publication of photographs that
depicted the famous princess-in American parlance, a public figure-and her
children in their daily lives. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.,
available at http://www.echr.coe.int (visited May 11, 2006).
27. Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away From Work, 66 La. L. Rev. 945,947.
28. See generally Finkin, Menschenbild, supra note 24.
29. Summers, supra note 8, at 84.
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D. Secrets
The secrets perspective on workplace privacy overlaps with the
aversion to surveillance perspective discussed above, but focuses
on the disclosure of particular data or information, obtained by
non-surveillance means, that an employee would prefer not to
share. While favoring a broader working definition of workplace
privacy, 30 Charles Craver takes time to pause over secrets. His
contribution to this Symposium benefits from his decades of
experience in labor and employment law. For instance, when
discussing the contemporary topic of unwanted genetic scrutiny as
a condition of obtaining a new job, Craver recalls the years
preceding the Americans with Disabilities Act when employers
routinely demanded pre-hiring physical examinations, and
questioned job applicants extensively about their medical
histories.
3 1
Medical secrets come up also in Willborn's contribution. Like
Fisk, he mentions professional athletes: Trevis Smith, a Canadian
Football League linebacker, consented to an employer-
administered HIV test, but did not consent to the release of its
result, which was positive; Eddie Curry, who was playing
basketball for the Chicago Bulls when he was diagnosed with an
irregular heartbeat, refused a request by the Bulls to take a DNA to
rule out hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, a condition that had killed
other basketball stars.32 This variation on a theme of privacy
returns us to the Gavison fundamentals, which begin with
"secrecy." 33
30. Craver, supra note 7.
31. Id. at 1058. One summer back in the Pleistocene era I was a college
student seeking a ten-week gig as a secretary. I applied for a position at a large
New York bank, where a human-resources manager told me I would have to go
through a medical exam before I could be hired. Workplace drug testing not
been having been invented, I couldn't imagine what these functionaries sought
to uncover in an 18-year-old who had aced their typing test and needed a
summer job. Maybe pregnancy? For someone who didn't savor medical
probing even under warmer conditions, the prospect of being examined in a
bank office--fluorescent lights, chilly air-conditioning--by a physician who
looked at bodies in terms of business needs rather than patient health seemed
creepy, a bit Mengele-like. See generally Finkin, Privacy, supra note 3, at 5-6
(summarizing the history of this practice-which is indeed somewhat sinister). I
never returned for the checkup, and instead accepted a job with a real estate firm
that was uninterested in taking advantage of this pre-ADA employer
prerogative. I suppose employment-at-will fans would applaud my 1979 story:
the bank and I both asserted and stuck to our differing wishes, free from
regulatory intervention. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
32. Willbom, supra note 5, at 987-90.
33. See Gavison, supra note 11.
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E. Power and Powerlessness
The Symposium has led some contributors to reflect on
distributions of power in the workplace. For Fisk, dress codes may
be "as much about power as about discrimination," whenever "an
employer feels empowered to articulate and enforce" such codes
without feeling a need to give reasons for them.34 Dress codes are
conventionally understood to be about something other than
power, such as "screening" (the generic term for filtering
undesirable goods from desirable ones in a market), "signaling"
(i.e., conveying to the employer that a prospective employee is
willing to live with the image the dress code suggests), or
stereotyping (as in famous workplace cases like Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins 5 and Jespersen v. Harrah 's Operating Company 36).
Fisk goes on to argue, however, that a "privacy analysis" 37 exposes
the shallowness, or at least the inadequacy, of these rival
explanations. 38 In Hopkins, for example, Price Waterhouse not
only stereotyped the plaintiff ("dress more femininely," "1 wear
more makeup"), but also went out of its way to insult her.39 Fisk
reminds us of the upper-income norm that all rules about how to
dress must be conveyed gently-by example or perhaps through
peer pressure--and never in the style of "the headmistress of [the
young Catherine Fisk's] parochial school who used to feel entitled
to remark on which girls wore their uniform skirts too short and
who needed to polish her saddle shoes.' 4 °
Taking a different view of the point where workplace privacy
meets workplace power and powerlessness, Michael Selmi regards
privacy as a relatively trivial desire among the mix of wishes that
workers might bring to their jobs. He wryly remarks that if
privacy implicates dignity, then the working poor face direr threats
than what is at issue here in our Symposium: "if we were
concerned about employee dignity4 we ought to begin by requiring
employers to pay a living wage." Selmi argues that because of
structures that make employers more powerful than employees, the
path to augmenting employee power lies in making the workplace
34. Fisk, supra note 20, at 1121-22.
35. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490
U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
36. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated for rehearing, 409 F.3d 1061 (2005).
37. Fisk, supra note 20, at 1125.
38. Id. at 1125.
39. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 463.
40. Fisk, supra note 20, at 1118.
41. Selrni, supra note 6, at 1045.
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smaller; any terrain that workers share with bosses must become
yet another locus of employee disempowerment.42 For this reason,
Selmi disapproves of employer-purchased largesse like home
computers and company cars.4 Far from generous offerings, these
Trojan horses sneak the workplace into what should be the
employee's space away from employers regnant. Selmi would
prohibit employers from furnishing equipment that is amenable to
both personal and occupational use, thereby forcing the employer
either to convey the equipment as a gift or abandon this version of
technology transfer. 44 Whenever boss and worker meet on a
worksite, the worker is necessarily weak, and the boss strong at the
worker's expense. To narrow the power gap, says Selmi, narrow
the workplace.45
From these divergent understandings of workplace privacy, we
now turn to the themes implicated.
H. SYMPOSIUM THEME 1: INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF GROUPS
Privacy, a quintessentially solitary notion, finds in the
workplace a setting that necessarily excludes some solitude. In the
workplace, a person coexists with other people. Isolated locales
for human labor are called turrets, garrets, monasteries, and
homes-not "the workplace." In this sense, every workplace
contains groups.
For employment lawyers, of course, the line between
individuals and groups has more particular urgency. Employment
law as a field is an offspring of labor law. Unions and
management are both collectives consisting of many individuals,
and the struggle between these two groups is the grand conflict of
labor law. If this struggle is the grand conflict of labor law, the
grand lament of labor-law scholarship is to mourn the lessening of
labor union strength (or "density"), especially in the private sector.
42. Id. at 1046.
43. Accord Lane, supra note 1, at 229 ("For all intents and purposes,
bringing a company computer into your home is the equivalent of giving your
employer a key to the front door.").
44. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1047.
45. Id.
46. At the spoken version of the conference Pauline Kim remarked that
having gone to law school in the late 1980s she is of a first generation, a group
of employment law scholars who took a class in law school called Employment
Law, and so in their studies of the workplace were not limited to the more
venerable Labor Law. Kim, supra note 5. Selmi, Kim's contemporary, was also
of the early employment law generation as a student at Harvard Law School.
More senior participants at the conference like Finkin and Craver came to
employment law following their teaching and writing about labor law.
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No truism about labor and employment gets repeated more often in
the law reviews; 4 7 our Symposium participants remarked on it as
well.48
To many in the labor-and-employment community, unions
have dwindled not because they became obsolete, but because
management attacked them successfully, with the help of pliant
federal labor law. As a consequence, individual workers have lost
power.49 This perspective sees the individual worker as lonely,
while the worker united among fellow workers is powerful. A
downward spiral for workers emerges: Labor unions dwindle, and
appear weak; workers lose faith in unions because of this manifest
weakness; workers withdraw their support and engagement from
organization drives or existing unions; labor unions dwindle more.
A sickly version of individualism enters the worker like a
tapeworm, making her unable to come together with her fellows.
This perverse individualism tells the worker falsely that she is
better off on her own. It is labor and employment law that begat
the pejorative "tortification" (to which I coming from Torts first
took umbrage, but later came to accept). "Tortification" refers,
inter alia, to the seductive effect of workplace torts on worker
consciousness: A worker thinks that if harmed by an employer, she
can sue and be just as well off as if she could call on the support of
a union.5°
47. On March 10, 2006, I typed "decline w/10 unions" into the Allrev
database of Lexis, and got 1110 hits. As "decline" is hardly a universal term of
art to describe this phenomenon, I am sure I found only a fraction of the
lamentation, even though there were false positives among the 1110 articles.
48. Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting
Employee Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 La. L.
Rev. 1009, 1009 (2006); Selmi, supra note 6, at 1038 (noting that even in
whatever year one chooses to call the peak of the "lost era of labor dominance,"
nowhere near half of private sector workers were union members).
49. See Charles B. Craver, Can Unions Survive?: The Rejuvenation of the
American Labor Movement 47-51 (1993); James A. Gross, Broken Promise:
The Subversion of U.S. Labor Relations Policy 1947-1994 (1995) (arguing that
current labor policy has, in defiance of congressional intent, turned against
workers and unions); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the
Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 35 1,
361-73 (2002) (arguing that if more neutral explanations for the decline of
unions-increased globalization, the changing workforce composition, and the
rise of contingent work-were correct and complete, then the decline of unions in
the United States would be comparable to that in Europe, yet it has been much
more severe; employer hostility to unions and weak federal law must be part of
the explanation); Julius G. Getman, Explaining the Fall of the Labor Movement,
41 St. Louis L.J. 575, 579 (1997) (arguing that federal labor law permits, and
perhaps encourages, bad-faith behavior by employers).
50. See Anita Bernstein, Muss es Sein? Not Necessarily, Says Tort Law, 67
Law & Contemp. Probs. 7, 13 n.28 (2004) (reviewing "tortification" in the labor
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What does privacy have to do with it? Of the participants, Kim
focuses most on this question of unions and individuals in the
workplace. Her article looks at workplace drug testing as resisted
and protested, first by unions and later by individual litigants.5'
This extended analysis of one category of privacy claim from the
workplace brings forward not only the doctrinal points that Kim
notes-for example, whether unions can waive the privacy rights
of an individual worker--but also the larger question of whether
the lost strength of unions can ever be equaled or replicated in the
workplace by some other means, perhaps a different type of
aggregation. 5 In this discussion, Kim implicitly works with
privacy in its "power" aspect.53 Privacy is a good over which
unions and management fight, just as they struggle to distribute
other goods in the workplace. The trouble with this conception of
privacy, as Kim acknowledges (Finkin and Selmi also touch on
this point in different ways), is that when thrown into a bundle of
distributions that includes more tangible goods-like money, paid
leave, and health insurance---ivacy cannot make a strong claim
on the energies of negotiators. 4 Unions will cede privacy to gain
other goods for members.
The other extended discussion of workplace collectives in this
Symposium comes from Craver, who of our contributors focuses
the most on overt conflicts between unions and management. He
notes that in one struggle that might be seen in terms of privacy,
the question of proselytizing and recruitment with respect to
organizing drives, employers may treat employees as a captive
audience, dinning anti-union sentiment into their ears, while
organizers enjoy much less access to workers' consciousness.5 5
and employment law literature). The trap is that the employee forfeits union
power in exchange for
a chance to buy a lottery-ticket shot at the million-dollar judgment that
every now and then one lucky abused worker will win. Unions provide
protections for continued employment that cover many more workers
than wrongful discharge litigation can ever deliver. In this view, tort
law becomes the rhetorical favorite of the enemy. Of course, the bosses
will say, you don't need to organize, you can always sue them if they do
you wrong. And you won't have to pay union dues either, imagine!
Workplace torts, in short, isolate the individual without protecting his
or her rights.
Id. at 14.
51. Kim, supra note 48.
52. Id. at 1025-31.
53. See supra Part I.E.
54. See Kim, supra note 48.
55. Craver, supra note 7, at 1061.
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Similarly, employers commit what might be seen as invasions
when they forbid workers from sharing information with one
another about their compensation, a silencing policy that the
National Labor Relations Act proscribes, but that nevertheless
seems to flourish.56 Employers also invoke privacy piously when
union representatives ask for data about "wages, job
classifications, hours, and working conditions," all of which
"enable representative unions to decide what to discuss. 57 Craver,
in short, finds workplace privacy a troublesome concept, both for
what it does and what it fails to do. When hearing the phrase
"workplace privacy" Craver, along with Kim, thinks of power and
unions.58 He concludes that if something resembling "workplace
privacy" can silence conversations between workers, deny their
representatives access to facts necessary for collective bargaining,
and keep organizers away from the worksite, then perhaps privacy
is a problem rather than a desideratum to be pursued.59
IH. SYMPOSIUM THEME 2: AGAINST EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The venerable Clyde Summers has written that this peculiar
stance of American law conceives of "the employment relation as a
dominant-servient relation rather than one of mutual rights and
obligations." 6  Supreme authority over the worker becomes a
triumph for management:
The employer, as owner of the enterprise, is viewed as
owning the job with a property right to control the job and
the worker who fills it. That property right gives the
employer the right to impose any requirement on the
employee, give any order and insist on obedience, change
any term of employment, and discard the employee at any
time. The employer is sovereign over his or her employee
subjects. 6 1
As Professor Summers describes employment at will, this
doctrine extends far beyond the mutual prerogative of two
contracting parties to commence and terminate their dealings as
they please:
56. Id. at 1065-66.
57. Id. at 1066.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Summers, supra note 8, at 78.
61. Id.
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Its tentacles reach into seemingly remote areas of labor law,
for at its roots is a fundamental legal assumption regarding
the relation between an employer and its employees. The
assumption is that the employee is only a supplier of labor
who has no legal interest or stake in the enterprise other
than the right to be paid for labor performed. The
employer, as owner of the enterprise, is legally endowed
with the sole right to determine all matters concerning the
operation of the enterprise.
62
Once a legal system accepts employment at will, as several
Symposium contributors observe, it becomes hard for that system
to honor the privacy of employees in the workplace. 63  The
conclusion runs a fortiori: Any worker who can be discharged
"for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all'" must surely
have to endure less adverse actions without recourse. An invasion
of privacy in this light becomes merciful rather than arbitrary: "I
could fire you and have security guards escort you from my
property this instant," says the employer in effect, "but instead I
choose only to [read your e-mail or blog] [draw blood or urine
from your body] [take pictures of you by stealth]. By this means, I
propose a mere modification of our agreement. If you don't like it,
fine: you share the same prerogative of termination that I hold;
you should end our relationship if you so desire. If you don't avail
yourself of this choice, then I shall assume you are content to
maintain our employment contract on the new terms."
65
And so Fisk regretfully advised an electrician ordered to wear
khaki trousers at work that he had to choose between resigning and
putting on the offending garment, which would have led to
humiliation at work: Due to a medical condition, the man's body
produced an excess of perspiration that would look like urine stains
62. Id. at 65.
63. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1036 ("As a basic precept, it is difficult to
reconcile workplace privacy with the at-will relationship."); Finkin, supra note
27, at 948) (describing a law review article defending employer control over
employees' off-work activity as "worthy of consideration [only] because it
perfectly captures Americans' managerial ideology").
64. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 1596 n. 297 (2002). The oft-cited case here is Payne v.
Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507, 526-27 (1884).
65. This kind of reasoning goes all the way back to Payne, the 1884
decision that serves as a founding document of employment at will. See supra
note 64; Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad, 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884)
("All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for good cause,
for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of
legal wrong. A fortiori they may 'threaten' to discharge them without thereby
doing an illegal act, per se.").
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against a light-colored fabric background. His employer refused to
grant him an exception from the dress code that would let him
wear navy blue, and so the electrician chose to quit his job.66
Willborn adverts to employment at will when he advocates treating
waivers signed by the employee at the time of employment (where
the waivers often should be enforced) differently than waivers
signed, say, "after ten years of employment" 67 (where the waivers
often should not be enforced). Employment at will ideology
notwithstanding, employees enjoy much more of their free "will"
when the relationship begins, but can suffer from coercion later.
Gely and Bierman note that employment at will has resulted in
"little legal protection to employees facing employer discipline for
work-related or other blogging." 68 It allows an employer to fire an
employee for the offense of bringing a woman not his wife to a
company banquet and for marrying a co-worker 69 --two episodes
presented to the courts (unsuccessfully) as privacy-violating
management diktat.70 Kim tips her hat to employment at will when
she remarks that employees who do not want to submit to drug
tests can respond by "exiting the workplace or avoiding employers
that require testing." 71 Craver responds in a similar manner when
writing about "paper and pencil tests that purportedly measure test-
taker honesty": "Since applicants who do not wish to take such
tests can simply look for work elsewhere, courts would be unlikelX
to find that these testing practices violate basic privacy rights."
In sum, every contribution in this Symposium has paused at least
once over employment at will.
IV. THE JOB OF WORKPLACE PRIVACY
To review: Workplace privacy has many facets. Among those
that emerge in this Symposium--and this list is not
exhaustive--are the human aversion to surveillance, autonomy, the
hard-to-translate Persinlichkeitsrecht (the German legal category
encompassing personality and personhood), secrets, and struggles
over power and powerlessness. Contributors have invoked these
concepts in their discussions of workplace privacy. Along with
this diverse range of aspects, their contributions also present two
unifying themes: (1) a dialectic between individualistic and
66. Fisk, supra note 20, at 1114-15.
67. Willborn, supra note 5, at 986.
68. Gely & Bierman, supra note 15, at 1091.
69. Id. at 1094.
70. Id.
71. Kim, supra note 48, at 1026.
72. Craver, supra note 7, at 1073.
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collectivist understandings of what it means to be a worker inside a
workplace during these days (or decades) of union decline, and (2)
a concern with employment at will, the American legal doctrine
that appears to crush whatever privacy entitlements a worker might
wish to assert.
Do the themes of the last paragraph cohere? I believe so. Our
seven papers together present a view of the functions that
"workplace privacy," that maddeningly ineffable phrase, performs
within employment law.
Start with employment at will--which is by no means a
monolithic shield against emploxee complaint.73 One state has
abolished the doctrine by statute,. while others have produced a
range of judicial decisions that reduce its application: they offer
remedies for wrongful discharge that rely on a panoply of
protective constructs. 7" Commentary on the doctrine (if one puts
aside some non-normative work about its origins in American legal
history76) is overwhelmingly hostile.77 The doctrine lingers,
however, 78 because neither state legislatures nor Congress nor state
courts nor federal courts seem inclined to challenge the basic claim
that employment is a contract that should remain intact only to the
73. My two home states, New York and Georgia, have been described as
exceptionally faithful to the doctrine. Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful
Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 517 (2004) ("On one
extreme, Georgia, Alabama, and New York adhere rigidly to employment at will
and permit few, if any, exceptions to the rule.").
74. Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-
901 (2005).
75. Anne M. Rector, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace:
A Proposal for Federal Legislation Limiting Drug Screening, 35 Emory L.J.
1011, 1022 (1986) (classifying judicially created exceptions as relying on public
policy, implied-in-fact covenants, implied covenants, or public policy torts). See
also Summers, supra note 8, at 75 (noting that five states limit employment at
will by imposing a covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
76. See Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding
Employment-at-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 Berkeley J. Lab. &
Emp. L. 91, 96-98 (1996) (summarizing historical surveys).
77. See Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle" Discrimination in Employment,
24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 377, 426 (2003) ("'At will' employment has
been criticized by many scholars, various task forces, and so on."). But see
Robert Howie & Lawrence Shapero, Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes: A
Dangerous Erosion of At-Will Employment, a Passing Fad, or Both?, 31 Emp.
Rel. L.J. 21 (2005) (defending and extending the doctrine).
78. Sugarman, supra note 77, at 426 ("It is not the rule in Europe or Japan,
for example. Yet, for the present, only Montana has replaced it, and there is
little reason to believe that other states will soon be added to the list."); see also
Summers, supra note 8, at 85 (claiming that "the trend in the last ten years has
been toward more employer dominance").
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extent that both employer and employee wish to continue it, and
into whose terms the government will typically not intrude.
At first look, the reasoning about workplace privacy afortiori
that we have considered appears impeccable. A greater
prerogative (the power to discharge a worker without cause) must
imply a lesser one (the power unilaterally to impose working
conditions that might offend some employees enough to drive
them from the job). Yet this reasoning may be peccable after all.
The greater might not always imply the lesser. To start, most
employees, managers, lawyers, labor and employment scholars,
legislators, and judges active today came of age in the workplace
after enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Those whose
arrival at work predated federal civil rights legislation have had
decades to get used to the notion that an employer may not impose
detriments on workers based on certain characteristics.
Accordingly, it is fair to say that most of us who look at, or earn
our living in, the workplace hold two notions simultaneously in our
heads: (1) an employer may discharge a worker without cause, for
bad cause, for no cause, and yet (2) may not discharge a worker
on the basis of, say, race.
From there, it may not be inconsistent for workers and those
who study them to believe that (1) employment at will is a fixture
in American law, and not an intolerable one; it may resonate in the
United States along with prevalent beliefs about the nature of
freedom in a market economy, and yet (2) once the "will" of an
employer joins the "will" of an employee or a prospective
employee to form a durable employment relation, that relation
ought to honor the privacy interest that workers bring to their jobs.
This notion of privacy might include Personlichkeitsrecht, freedom
from (unjustified) surveillance, autonomy, or the desire for a
modicum of power. Certainly I do not mean to say that privacy in
this sense will always create entitlements for workers that the law
should enforce. Participants in this Symposium speak plainly
about privacy claims that they say ought to be resolved, without
anguish, in favor of employers. 8 1 My suggestion instead is that
79. See Estlund, supra note 64.
80. Gabrielle S. Friedman & James Q. Whitman, The European
Transformation of Harassment Law: Discrimination Versus Dignity, 9 Colum. J.
Eur. L. 241, 267 (2003) ("At-will employment is much more familiar and well-
accepted in America than on the continent--both in American law and in the
mobile culture of American employment markets. By tradition, Americans
routinely leave jobs, moving on to something else, just as they routinely leave
one part of the country to move to another.").
81. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1042-43 ("Concerns about trade secrets, possible
harassment suits, employee theft, efficiency in the workplace, unauthorized use
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recognition of privacy interests, just like recognition of an interest
in freedom from employment discrimination, can coexist with
employment at will.82
The articles of this Symposium, particularly the contribution of
Finkin, may be interpreted to go a step further: The United States
might one day abandon employment at will as unsound. We have
alreadv noted that the smart money is betting on its continued
force.°3 Perhaps the pressures of globalization will shove the
doctrine into Europe and other industrialized nations that to date
have resisted it. Should the opposite teaching--a Montana-style
American repudiation of employment at will--gain strength, I
believe the concept of workplace privacy will have earned much of
the credit.
Contributions to this Symposium make the point in their
numerous references to the dignity of a worker. Unlike the
concepts identified above as aspects of workplace privacy, the
notion of dignity is not, to our contributors, a defining element the
way autonomy or Pers6nlichkeitsrecht might be. Yet the theme is
pervasive. When Finkin writes about the master-servant
relationship, for example, he recalls "the natural and inevitable
authority of the master" as a source of contemporary managerial
prerogative. 84 He does not expressly say, but a reader may surely
infer, that this tradition affronts the dignity of an adult human
being. The contribution of Fisk is all about dignity: as she argues,
humiliation derives from loss of autonomy.85 Willborn builds his
of property, and so on, all justify keeping a watch on employees in a way that
might infringe upon their privacy interests.") (noting that "the employee has
been hired to work, and has no right to send private emails, view pornography,
shop, blog, instant message, or talk on the phone."); Craver, supra note 7, at
1069 ("Despite the fact that most employees think they enjoy certain privacy
protections at work, they do not. As a result, companies can lawfully keep track
of everything they type on their computers.").
82. To the extent that employment at will must give way to recognition of
workplace privacy, I agree with Professor Corbett that common law
development rather than new legislation will be the instrument. See Corbett,
supra note 1. Vaguer and less determinate that the proscribed categories of civil
rights legislation, claims of privacy call for a more flexible and nuanced
enforcement than what a statute can provide. See generally Marley S. Weiss,
The Impact of the European Community on Labor Law: Some American
Comparisons, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1427, 1441 (1993) ("It is no accident that
the most substantial derogation from managerial control, the erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine, has been crafted by state judges rather than
legislators.")
83. See Sugarman, supra note 77, at 426; Summers, supra note 8.
84. Finkin, supra note 27, at 956.
85. Fisk, supra note 20, at 1125-26, 1136-46.
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argument with reference to offensiveness.8 6 In her analysis of the
relative strengths of collective- and individual-initiated litigation,
Kim focuses on workers' dignity as likely toget short shrift when
unions rather than individuals bring suit. Selmi disparages
privacy as relatively unimportant when he notes the indignity of
not earning a decent wage. 89
Given that all the contributors care about employment at will,
their frequent references to dignity may suggest a connection
between the two concepts. A worker asserting her own dignity
might start by conceding the contractual basis of her employment.
"But that doesn't mean I'm not a human being," she might
continue. "I've agreed to work here and you have agreed to
employ me. That doesn't mean.. ." and here she could mention a
particular offense. In the skein that I find connecting the
contributions of this Symposium, assertions of privacy and
erosions of employment at will are woven together. Joining the
consensus expressed in Baton Rouge, I see no other
development-in particular, no statute9 0-that could have so much
force in the struggle against employment at will in its hypertrophic
form.
In particular labor unions, noteworthy within our Symposium
Theme 1, cannot handle the job of eroding employment at will by
making claims about trammeled worker dignity. Unions are
structured to fight for material gains and inclined to downplay
what look like idiosyncratic individual needs. Accordingly, our
participants have concluded that unions are doing little to advance
workplace privacy.91 At the "live" portion of this Symposium,
participants expressed some regret and nuance on this point.
Pauline Kim noted that privacy norms are grounded in collectives:
without groups of human beings, it becomes absurd to speak of
privacy violations. 92 Steven Willborn said that abandoning the
collective as a privacy-rights negotiator must imperil the collective
in its work of making other claims of power.9  In other words,
86. Willborn, supra note 5, at 982-85, 988-95.
87. Kim, supra note 48, at 1031.
88. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1045-46.
89. See supra Part III.
90. See generally Lane, supra note 1, at 254-58 (summarizing failed
congressional legislation that would have protected employees' interests
generally and their privacy rights in particular).
91. See supra pp. 931-32.
92. Kim, supra note 5.
93. Steven Willborn, Dean & Schmoker Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska College of Law, Workplace Privacy: The Role of Employee Consent,
Address at the Louisiana Law Review Symposium: Privacy in the Workplace
(Feb. 9, 2006).
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weak unions mean a continuation of current weak workplace
privacy rights.
Fair enough: but let me end this Foreword on an optimistic
note, building on where our contributors have gone beyond the
standard requiem for a dead institution; they have suggested a vital
role for the collective as a source of workplace privacy. That
private-sector labor unions are moribund they do not deny. But
they do not leave the privacy-seeking individual in the workplace
without peers and support. Here are two of their ideas, one from
the spoken portion of the conference, and another that readers may
extract from the pages that follow.
At a question-and-answer session, Gely offered a suggestion
about groups and collectives: Perhaps solidarity for workers can
emerge outside the formally recognized collective bargaining unit,
he remarked. 94 We do not yet know, here in 2006, whether the
blogs that he and Bierman write about here are an idle fad; whether
online or virtual "communities" have any substantive content; or
how to identify power in media that can vanish in a click. We can
be sure, however, that communication technology is altering
relationships among human beings at an extraordinary pace.
Although linked by new media, persons are likely to retain their
old, longstanding desire for connection with other persons.
American law inhibits them from forming labor unions; 95 but
technological change, or some other phenomenon not yet in sight,
might foster human unions of another kind.
Complementing this expression of tentative faith in a new
collective, Selmi has sought to give this new entity a place to do its
work. It has become a clich6 to castigate our 24/7 machines-our
cell phones, handheld palm-style computers, global positioning
devices, networked information systems-as an electronic leash
that ties workers to managerial prerogative. Selmi reminds us that
these machines have off buttons. Go on, press yours. Refuse the
"free" company car that beams your location to a tracking device;
claim your down time and take a real vacation; and if you feel you
can't say no to the beep summons, a few new laws could help build
you your barrier.96
94. Gely, supra note 17.
95. See supra Part II.
96. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1045.
942 [Vol. 66
V. CONCLUSION
Separately and as a whole, the articles in this Symposium use
familiar concepts to look at workplace privacy anew. They present
this subject as both a manifestation of what now occupies all of
employment law---especially employment at will and the tension
between collective and individualistic understandings of the
American worker---and a source of future change in this body of
law. Our contributors find in workplace privacy an opportunity to
reflect on employment law in its entirety. What do we talk about
when we talk about workplace privacy? All of employment
law-along with the hopes and distress that we as individuals bring
to this subject.
When we talk about workplace privacy, we also talk about
privacy unmodified. Consider the choice manifested in Finkin's
Privacy in Employment Law, where the introduction begins with9
discussion of privacy simpliciter, rather than workplace privacy:"
the two categories are not easily isolated from each other. Fast-
moving technological change and a so-named war on terror that
perceives danger to lurk in ordinary civilian life have combined to
threaten "secrecy, solitude and anonymity"8 by means that
individuals find hard to anticipate until after they experience what
feels like a violation. These changes make privacy claims harder
to express.
Here, the workplace lends a hand. Though unlikely to succeed
in a court or grievance proceeding, claims by workers against
employers provide a forum to speak about the boundary between
tolerable and intolerable intrusions that escapes preemptive
assertions. Such preemptions can cut off discussion: "You don't
understand the technology," a silencer might say; other contexts
can provoke references to "national security," or evS suggestions
that the speaker has taken up the cause of terrorism. As a source
of context, experiences in the varied world of American
employment foster a necessary conversation. Most people work.
Most jobs are capable of accommodating some conception of
employee privacy, a line that employers should not cross.
Workplace privacy still eludes definition, but has a function: it
helps us talk about what individuals need to live well in a free
society.
97. See supra note 3.
98. See Willborn, supra note 11.
99. See David Sarasohn, Administration Throws Mud While Losing Ground,
Newhouse News Serv., Mar. 17, 2006 (reporting that national political figures,
including Senator Wayne Allard and Representative John Boehner, the House
Majority Leader, accused Senator Russell Feingold of "siding with terrorists"
when he introduced a measure to censure President Bush for wiretapping
without a court order).
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